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Abstract 
The use of private funding and management enjoys an increasing trend in airports. The 
literature has not paid enough attention to the mixed management models in this 
industry, although many European airports take the form of mixed public-private 
companies, where ownership is shared between public and private sectors. We examine 
the determinants of the degree of private participation in the European airport sector. 
Drawing on a sample of the 100 largest European airports we estimate a multivariate 
equation in order to determine the role of airport characteristics, fiscal variables and 
political factors on the extent of private involvement. Our results confirm the alignment 
between public and private interests in partially privatized airports. Fiscal constraints 
and market attractiveness promote private participation. Integrated governance models 
and the share of network carriers prevent the presence of private ownership, while the 
degree of private participation appears to be pragmatic rather than ideological.  
 






The standard framework of analysis on public services delivery choices has focused on 
the choice between pure public production and pure private production, and a large 
amount of research, theoretical as well as empirical, has analyzed why governments 
choose to privatize public services or, instead, stick with public delivery [Bel and 
Fageda (2007, 2009) offer recent and wide reviews of this literature]. However, a sharp 
public - private contraposition does not take into account that organizational boundaries 
are not so clearly defined, and instead we can think of a public-private continuum  
(Perry and Rainey, 1988; Stiglitz, 1989). Furthermore, Warner and Hebdon (2001) 
emphasize that privatization is not the sole available option for the reform of local 
services, and Hefetz and Warner (2007) argue that analysis must move beyond the 
either/or dichotomy of public versus private production. Increasing attention has been 
paid to the fact that local government contracting is a complex management process,1 
which combines transactions costs, managerial concerns, and social choice issues, and 
this has triggered interest in analyzing reforms other than strict privatization and 
contracting out.  
One stream of research has paid attention to mixed delivery modes in the US 
(Stein, 1990, Miranda and Lerner 1995), where mixed delivery implies that a 
government divides her jurisdiction in several service districts, and pure public delivery 
                                                            
1 Local services management offers an appropriate background for the analysis of airports economics and 
management. Local/metropolitan responsibility for airports is by far the most frequent model in the large 
OECD countries: the USA, Canada, France –besides Paris-, Italy, UK –besides BAA-, Germany –
together with state governments-, etc. (see Bel and Fageda, 2007, for a review and discussion of 
management models in the OECD countries). And more fundamentally, airports are single facilities (as 
opposite to surface transportation, usually characterized by networks), so they have economic 
characteristics similar to those of local/metropolitan public services.  
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is used in one or more districts while pure private production is used in other district(s) 
within the same jurisdiction (Warner and Bel, 2008). Warner and Hefetz (2008) show 
significant growth in mixed delivery modes in the US since 1997, an issue further 
analyzed in Hefetz and Warner (2012).2  
Another stream of research has been devoted to analyze why governments engage in 
cooperation to provide public services. This literature has developed especially for the 
US, where intermunicipal cooperation frequently takes the form of intermunicipal 
agreements through which two municipalities make a contract assigning responsibility 
for the service to just one of the municipalities (Holzer and Fry, 2011). As such, the 
system operated might be seen as intermunicipal contracting. However, other types of 
intermunicipal cooperation exist, such as horizontal production arrangements with other 
governments (see Feiock and Scholz, 2010). More generally, an interesting and fertile 
research agenda has been developed, based on the institutional collective action (ICA) 
framework, which  extends theories of collective action among individuals to 
institutionally defined composite actors such as local government units (Feiock 2007; 
Feiock and Scholz 2010). 
Factors influencing intermunicipal cooperation have been empirically studied in 
Warner and Hefetz (2002), who find that smaller cities more likely to cooperate with the 
larger local governments to gain economies of scale. Fiscal reasons appear to be related 
to the decision to cooperate, and a weaker tendency to cooperation is found for 
                                                            
2 Empirical evidence on the effects of mixed delivery in the USA is scarce. A recent work by Davis 
(2012) compares different types of delivery arrangements in three cities, and finds that mixed public-
private in Indianapolis' delivery is more fiscally efficient and environmentally effective than single 




communities enjoying better financial conditions [be these budget per capita (Wood, 
2006), total city tax revenues (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha, 2009), tax revenues per 
capita (Krueger and Bernick, 2010), or own source revenue (Kwon and Feiock, 2010)].3 
LeRoux and Carr (2007) and Leroux, Brandenburger and Pandey (2010) find that other 
city and regional characteristics different from fiscal conditions might be influential, 
and social networks might be as well. Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha (2009) find 
cooperation negatively related to population. Shrestha and Feiock (2011) find that 
interlocal cooperation is shaped by the nature and the degree of transaction risks as well 
as by reciprocal exchange relationships. Interestingly, Bickers, Post and Stein (2010) 
find inter-municipal cooperation is used as a mean to promote careers of local office 
holders. And, in a more recent study, Hefetz and Warner (2012) emphasize the role 
cooperation can play in services when competition is low.  
In this paper we examine yet another strategy to go beyond the dilemma between 
pure delivery forms (public or private): we analyze the motivations that influence partial 
privatization of public services by means of mixed public-private companies (Backx, 
Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). With our paper we contribute to the literature by 
analyzing the determinants of the degree of private participation in the European airport 
sector. Hence, our focus is twofold: On one hand, we focus on the choice of mixed 
public-private companies instead of pure management models. On the other, we focus 
on the degree of private participation taking into account the percentage of private 
ownership of the firm.  
We draw on a sample including the 100 largest airports in Europe, which are 
characterized by a diverse involvement of private firms in their management, in order to 
estimate a multivariate equation using a generalized linear model with fractional 
                                                            
3 In this regard, see also Agranoff and McGuire (2003) and Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries (1977). 
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response variables. The analysis considers as explanatory variables several airport 
characteristics (amount and type of traffic, competition from nearby airports, airline’s 
attributes) along with fiscal and political factors taking into account that both private 
and public partners share interests in the association through mixed public-private 
companies governance models. 
With this empirical exercise we find that not only privatization of airports is a 
pragmatic choice of governments in Europe, but also it is the degree of private 
ownership. In this regard, our results indicate that private participation increases where 
public and private interests are compatible in terms of fiscal government relief (for the 
public sponsor) and market attractiveness (for the private partner). Furthermore, we find 
evidence that specific characteristics of airports like size, congestion, competition and 
type of dominant airlines influence on the involvement of private partners in these 
facilities through the use of mixed or fully privatized firms. These characteristics affect 
the expectations of private investors (current traffic, competition from other airports or 
the congestion level) or limit the interest of governments in losing their control (the 
percentage of network carriers that make the airport a strategic infrastructure). Finally, 
this article reveals the role played by governance models in terms of individual versus 
integrated airport management systems as determinant of private involvement, 
supporting recent empirical results regarding the degree of privatization in other sectors 
that show that single facilities are more prone to receive higher private participation 
than network infrastructure (Albalate, Bel and Geddes, 2011). 
Beyond the results of the role of all these characteristics leading to a larger or 
smaller degree of privatization we also show the importance of considering the British 
experience as a singularity in any study on airport privatization.  As it is shown, it 
should be taken into account its different and deeper approach to privatization than in 
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continental Europe. For this reason we claim that the British experience should be 
specifically treated in any empirical analysis on the European airport industry. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: MIXED PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPANIES AND 
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION 
Mixed public-private companies are organizational forms that escape the pure 
public/pure private dichotomy. Their ownership is divided between the government and 
the private sector, and they operate exclusively under private commercial law (Warner 
and Bel, 2008). Mixed public-private companies differ from contracts to private firms in 
several relevant aspects. First, and most important, governments can exert control 
through property rights over the mixed public-private companies, in addition to the 
control that can be exerted with regulatory tools. The government retains a voice in 
deciding the objectives to be pursued by the firm, even if these firms are managed 
independently of government. Therefore, managers of mixed public-private companies 
under effective control of government are expected to give more weight to the 
objectives of government and give less weight to profit maximization (Matsumura 
1998; Matsumura and Kanda 2005). 
Furthermore, government participation on the governing boards of the mixed public-
private companies helps to reduce the problems resulting from long-term incomplete 
contracts, thus reducing problems derived from transaction costs, which can be very 
important in contracting (Brown and Potoski, 2003a, 2003b, 2005). Schmitz (2000) 
shows that partial privatization may result in an optimal combination of incentives for 
reducing costs and improving quality in comparison to pure production forms (either 
public or private). 
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Mixed public-private companies are used in several European countries. They play a 
significant role in the delivery of local services in Spain  The private partners tend to be 
large firms with an established reputation for delivery of the particular local service. 
The government retains some degree of control in the firm, while day-to-day operations 
are usually conducted by the private partner (Bel 2006, Warner and Bel 2008).. This 
allows less costly monitoring, thus reducing transaction costs. In many cases, the 
government holds a majority of the shares.  
Mixed public-private companies in Italy are organizationally similar to those 
existing in Spain, but other types of mixed organizational forms mixed enterprises are 
not. For instance, in Italy Bognetti and Robotti (2007) include among mixed enterprises 
multi-government firms,, where there are several owners and all of them are public 
entities. Such multi-government enterprises represent 13% of public utilities in Italy.4 
This type of multi-government firm is not a partial privatisation, and is, therefore, 
outside our main object of study. It is important to recall that mixed public-private 
arrangements in the US usually have both pure private firms and pure public units 
delivering the service within one jurisdiction. Hence, it is not a form of partial 
privatization comparable to the partially privatized firms we find in Europe. 
The empirical literature on partial privatization of firms providing public services is 
extremely scant. As far as we know, there is only one work that analyzes the factors 
explaining the choice of mixed public-private companies for service delivery –instead 
of pure public or pure private forms-, that by Bel and Fageda (2010) for local services 
such as solid waste and service. Our paper goes beyond that contribution because we 
                                                            
4 Bognetti and Robotti (2003) analyze how the 2002 Financial Law promoted the using of market 
mechanisms in local services in Italy, including different types of public–private mixed firms. 
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analyze not only the choice of mixed public-private companies in the airport industry, 
but also the degree of private participation in those mixed public-private companies.  
As far as we know, the extent of private participation in mixed public-private 
companies has only been explored considering the choice on the contractual design of 
contracts in Albalate, Bel and Geddes (2011 and 2012). In these works the authors have 
studied the determinants of the contractual choice across different economic sectors as a 
proxy of private participation in the United States. On one hand, Albalate, Bel and 
Geddes (2011) show that private participation is greater in single infrastructure, while 
private collaboration has been more limited in the case of network infrastructure. 
Transaction costs and governance complexity might be behind this result. On the other, 
Albalate, Bel and Geddes (2012) just focused on the US water industry to find that 
differences between public and private salaries, together with the attractiveness of the 
potential market are two of the main factors leading to larger private involvements in a 
project. 
PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION AND MIXED AIRPORT COMPANIES IN 
EUROPE 
The use of private funding and management enjoys an increasing trend in the airport 
sector worldwide. The use of arrangements as public-private companies  may include a 
wide variety of contract types, institutional organizations and degrees of private 
involvement. However, the literature on privatization and contracting out has not paid 
enough attention to the mixed management models existing in the airport industry. On 
one hand, many European airports take the form of mixed public-private companies, 
partly owned by public sector and partly owned by the private sector, which implies 
collaboration beyond the pure public and pure private management models. This 
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alternative allows complementing the public and private interests in the management of 
strategic infrastructure. Being this said, it is not only the presence of private ownership 
in the firm, but the control of the ownership (majority) the key factor determining the 
degree of private management of the airport.  
Private participation in public-private companies also implies the transfer of risks to 
the private collaborator, what makes necessary an attractive business opportunity or 
enough State guarantees for a private partner in order to consider its participation in an 
infrastructure project.  In transportation projects construction and demand risks are two 
of the largest risks faced by any operator (Engel et al, forthcoming a; Estache, 2006), 
and financial results of such collaboration are definitely affected by cost and demand 
divergences from predictions to reality (Engel et al, forthcoming b).  
The term partial privatization intrinsically implies the agreement between a public 
sponsor and at least a private partner. Therefore, both expect to benefit from the 
partnership, complementing the public and private interests in the management of 
strategic infrastructure. On the side of the public sponsor, partial privatization provides 
funding for necessary infrastructure easing fiscal budget constraints, avoiding tax 
increases and expenditure cuts in other government activities. Also, it allows taking 
advantage of private incentives and specialized expertise to design, finance, build and 
operation activities so as to gain technical efficiency. On the side of the private partner, 
it seeks business opportunities in attractive markets where risks might be controlled 
under a safe regulatory framework given the association with the public sponsor. 
In the European airport sector contractual arrangements have usually taken the form 
of concessions or BOT-contracts, together with asset sales.  Management contracts or 
joint development agreements are rarely used to promote the collaboration with the 
private sector. As a result, it seems that private partners are incorporated in the airport 
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sector through the use of contracts requiring larger extents of private participation and 
risk transfers. Most of this private participation is required for the upgrading of 
Brownfield projects or for the building of new Greenfield projects, which demand large 
sums of investments.  
On the other hand, mixed public-private companies– the focus of our analysis - has 
a common organization form based on the mixed ownership in which private and public 
partners share the property of the firm running the Airport, even if this is organized 
under a concession contract. The private extent of private participation, therefore, might 
be measured as the percentage of the stake in private hands, what allows overcoming 
the dichotomy between pure public and pure private management models by including 
partial privatization in the analysis with mixed public-private companies. 
Indeed, ownership and management of airports in Europe had been, traditionally, in 
the hands of the government concerned, being this the national government or regional 
and local governments. However, since privatization of BAA (formerly British Airport 
Authority) in 1987 several companies that manage airports in Europe have majority 
private sector participation. 
Private sector participation will likely increase in coming years following the trend 
experienced recently. Several forces are still boosting governance reforms in the sector, 
such the pressure exerted on airport activity by airlines, which operate in a highly 
competitive environment - and therefore demand low prices and sufficient capacity to 
execute most of their operations-. On their side, governments often need to finance 
major investments in strategic airports in the current context of severe budgetary 
constraints and high opportunity costs. Also, privatization has triggered the emergence 




The empirical evidence regarding the effects of privatization on economic efficiency 
is scarce and inconclusive (Parker, 1999; Oum et al., 2006, 2008; Muller et al., 2008; 
Marques and Barros, 2010).Parker finds no significant differences in terms of efficiency 
for BAA airports before and after privatization. Oum et al. (2006, 2008) use a large 
sample of airports around the world and show that both airports wholly or partly 
controlled by private investors, by public firms, or by autonomous or independent 
authorities are more efficient than the airports controlled by multiple agents (partially 
privatized joint ventures, government-controlled companies from different territorial 
levels) or controlled by companies with multiple objectives (port authorities in the 
U.S.). 
Furthermore, Muller et al. (2008) analyzed the relative efficiency of the airports in 
the UK and Germany, considering that the first country in private ownership is more 
widespread. From their results, it follows that the differences between airports in both 
countries can be explained by the greater degree of vertical integration in Germany of 
airport activities, as for example the handling is managed by the airport operator itself in 
this country. Finally, Marques and Barros (2010) find that public airports are less 
efficient that privately owned airports. 
It should be noted that privatization can have an indirect impact to the extent that 
usually accompanied by new mechanisms of regulation of prices (Bel & Fageda, 2012). 
In this regard, Neimeier (2009) suggests the need of a regulatory reform of large 
airports to provide more incentives for cost savings and efficient pricing and 
investment.  
Table 1 shows the airport operators in the sample that have been either fully or 
partially privatized. The privatization of the BAA in 1987 was the first such experience 
in Europe. At the time of its privatization, the firm was managing three airports in the 
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London area (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted), three airports in Scotland (Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow) and Southampton. Since the early nineties, many other airport 
operators have been privatized in the UK. In fact, Manchester airport is currently the 
only large British airport managed by a government-owned enterprise. Note that airport 
privatization in the United Kingdom has generally been more prevalent than in the rest 
of Europe, and it has been of a different nature. Private investors in the UK have taken 
on the management of British airports, and at the same time they have purchased the 
airport infrastructure and land (with few exceptions, prominent among which is Luton 
Airport). Thus, airport privatization in the UK typically involves the transfer of assets to 
private investors.  
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
By contrast, in continental Europe, airport privatization typically means that private 
investors gain control of the firm managing the airport through a long-term concession, 
but the government retains ownership of the infrastructure and land. Hence, in 
continental Europe privatization is usually implemented through the contracting out of 
airport management. 
It is clear, therefore, that the airport privatization program has been particularly 
ambitious in the UK, involving full privatization in most cases. However, several large 
airports have also been privatized in Italy and Germany. The privatization of Venice 
airport took place at the same time as that of the BAA. In the middle of the nineties, the 
operators at Fiumicino and Ciampino in Rome and at the airport in Naples were sold to 
private investors. More recently, the airports of Pisa, Torino and Bologna have been 
fully or partially privatized. In Germany, private investors are shareholders of three of 
the country’s largest airports - Frankfurt, Dusseldorf and Hamburg - and a number of 
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others including Hanover. Finally, several airports in Europe’s capital cities have been 
fully or partially privatized since the mid-nineties. These include Charles de Gaulle and 
Orly in Paris, Athens, Budapest, Brussels, Copenhagen and Vienna.  
When private investors are not key shareholders in the firm managing the airport, 
regional or local governments are typically in charge of individual airports. However, 
there are a number of exceptions to this pattern; for example, the central government 
manages the airports of Amsterdam, Dublin and Prague. In each case, though, there 
were plans to privatize, but they have yet to be implemented. In addition, a number of 
central governments manage airports as a single national system. This is the case for 
example of Spain, Portugal, Finland, Norway or Romania (and to a lesser extent, 
Sweden as well). All these countries, with the exception of Spain, are characterized by 
the heavy concentration of air traffic in the capital city.    
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In this section, we estimate an equation that considers factors explaining privatization of 
European airports. There is an extensive empirical literature that examines factors 
explaining privatization.5 As far as we know, this is the first multivariate empirical 
study that focuses on airports.  
Previous studies that put the attention on specific services use as dependent variable 
a dichotomous variable that takes the value one when the service has been privatized 
and zero in other cases.  However, government choices may lie in a middle way 
between pure private and pure public production. Indeed, it is quite usual in some 
services like airports to find a partial privatization where the government retains a 
majority or minority share in the capital of the firm. To take this into account, we use as 
                                                            
5 See Bel & Fageda (2007b) and Bel, Fageda (2009) for a statistical review of this literature. 
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dependent variable the percentage of private ownership of the firm that manages the 
airport. In Europe, all airports with a significant level of traffic are managed by firms 
subject to commercial laws rather than by administrative entities. However, the 
percentage of shares of these firms controlled by private investors or governments is 
quite diverse across different countries. 
As determinants of privatization, we must take into account variables that may 
influence on the interest of private investors and variables that may provide incentives 
to governments to privatize. In this regard, most of previous studies on factors 
explaining privatization use variables for fiscal stress and ideology as explanatory 
factors. Furthermore, some of the variables used previously are specific of the 
considered service. Here, we use variables that account to fiscal stress and ideology of 
the government and specific variables related to the airports of the sample; size, type of 
airlines operating there and competition. We also include country specific variables to 
capture differences in the national policies of European countries.  
The empirical analysis is applied to European airports that generate a high volume 
of traffic: the sample comprises the 100 airports in the European Union, Switzerland 
and Norway with most passenger traffic in 2007. It is a fairly homogeneous area in 
economic terms and it is an area for which the information required for a study of this 
nature is available.  
We estimate the following equation for factors explaining the privatization of airport 
a in country c: 
Privateac= α + β1Total_Trafficac + β2Number_nearby_airportsac + 
β3%Airline_alliance_trafficac + β4Dslotsac + β5PublicDebtc + β6Ideologyc + β7Dsystemc + 
β8DUKc + ε                                                                                                                       (1)  
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where the variable to be determined is the percentage of private property owned by 
the management company. We gathered information about the ownership structure of 
the management companies at all the airports.  The sources of information regarding 
ownership were the web pages of the airports and the civil aviation authorities and the 
following studies: Oum et al. (2004), Marques and Brochado (2008) and Gillen and 
Niemeier (2008). The explanatory variables in equation (1) are: 
1) The airport’s total volume of traffic, Total_Traffic. Total traffic data up to 2007 
are available on the Eurostat web page. We expect a positive sign in the coefficient 
associated to this variable. Private investors may have more interest in larger airport 
because the expectations of future profits are higher. Furthermore, governments may 
obtain more revenues from the sale of a larger airport.   
2) The number of airports that lie fewer than 100 km from airport a, and which are 
managed by different operators, Number_nearby_airports. We only consider airports 
with passenger traffic greater than 150,000 individuals. This traffic threshold is the 
same as that used by Eurostat for differentiating between main and small commercial 
airports.  
We expect a negative sign in the coefficient associated to this variable. Private 
investors may be less interested in airports subject to competition from nearby facilities 
because such competition will push profits downward. From the point of view of 
governments, it is not clear whether they will have more incentives to privatize airports 
subject to competition.   
3) The percentage of traffic channeled by the airlines integrated within 
intercontinental airline alliances; Oneworld, Star Alliance and SkyTeam, 
%Airline_alliance_traffic. In this regard, we can distinguish between two types of 
business models in the current aviation market. First, network airlines that are integrated 
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in global alliances and that exploit the connecting traffic through hub-and-spoke 
systems. Second, low-cost airlines that are especially competitive in point-to-point short 
haul routes. Market share data for the airlines that operate at the respective airports for 
2007 are taken from information supplied by the Official Airlines Guide (OAG).  
Airports where a high proportion of traffic is channeled by network airlines may 
work as a hub for one of these airlines.6 Given the levels of traffic, governments could 
retain a majority share even when they choose to private them because hub airports may 
have a strategic role for national economic policies. Once we control for traffic, it is not 
clear a priori whether private investors will have more interest in airports dominated by 
network airlines.  
4) Government (central, regional and local) consolidated gross debt as a percentage 
of GDP in 2007, PublicDebt. 
We expect a positive sign in the coefficient associated to this variable. Indeed, 
governments may have strong incentives to privatize airports when they are subject to 
financial constraints. Governments may obtain substantial revenues from the sale of 
airports even in the case they retain some shares of the firm.7 Furthermore, investments 
to improve and expand current capacity of airports are frequently needed and 
governments may use privatization to save resources to that end.  
                                                            
6 %Airline_alliance_traffic has been shown to be the most important factor determining the degree of hub 
characteristics in each airport, especially when considering the largest airports, as we do in our sample. 
Furthermore, our variable is almost perfectly negatively correlated with %of low carriers in airports 
(Fageda and Flores-Fillol, 2012). Therefore, considering simultaneously our variable and a variable for % 
of low costs is not necessary, and would undermine the robustness of our estimation.  
7 We are thankful to a referee for the advice to use a variable related to non-aeronautical revenues in each 
airport. Indeed, that could be an interesting variable  to include in the estimation, but our sample will have 
a considerable reduction because of lack of homogeneous data for many airports.  
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5) An index of the ideological orientation of the political party in the central 
government, Ideology. We use the index built by the World Bank concerning the party 
orientation with respect to economic policy using the following criteria. Right: for 
parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Left: for 
parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Center: 
for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as 
centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). 
This index variable takes the value 1 for right wing parties, the value 2 for centrist 
parties and the value 3 for left wing parties. Data of this variable refer to the first year of 
privatization, while we refer to 2007 when the airport has not been privatized. 
We expect a negative sign in the coefficient associated to this variable. A priori 
right-wing parties should be more favorable to private production, while left-wing 
parties should be more favorable to maintain public firms.   
6) Dummy variable for coordinated airports in the allocation of slots, Dslots. It takes 
the value one for coordinated airports and the value zero for non-coordinated airports 
and schedule-supervised airports. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
classifies airports according to the degree of excess demand when establishing the 
procedures for allocating slots. The degree of excess of demand should be higher in 
coordinated airports. This variable is the most accurate indicator of the levels of 
congestion that we have been able to use.  
The expected sign of the coefficient associated to this variable is a priori ambiguous. 
It is not clear neither the interest of governments nor private investors on engaging in 
the privatization of congested airports.  Current profitability levels of congested airports 
may be high because of the intense utilization of the capacity. However, the amount of 
future investments needed to maintain the service levels may also be relevant. Given the 
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indivisibilities that characterize the airport industry, current profit levels may be 
combined with future losses.  
One could argue that congested airports require investments to expand capacity and 
therefore they might need private funds. However, this does not mean that congested 
airports are more likely to be private or public in a specific year. It could push future 
plans of privatization. As we only have data for one year, we must recognize that a 
possible limitation of our analysis is that we are not able to capture the dynamics of 
privatization policies in the airport industry.  
7) A dummy variable for airports located in United Kingdom, DUK. We expect a 
positive sign in the coefficient associated to this variable. Given the value of the other 
variables, United Kingdom has traditionally shown a stronger bias towards private 
ownership than countries in continental Europe.  
8) A dummy variable for airports in countries that are managed by a single entity as 
a system, Dsystem. These countries are Spain, Portugal, Greece (except Athens), Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Ireland and Finland. Some countries like Poland or Ireland have 
undertaken some reforms towards an individual management but most of airports are 
still controlled by the central government. 
We expect a negative sign in the coefficient associated to this variable. Privatization 
of airports managed like a system is more complicated than the sale of individual firms. 
Within the context of individualized management, privatization (full or partial) just 
implies the sale (all or some) shares of the public firm that manages the airport to 
private investors. Under a centralized management model, government must implement 
a restructuring process towards individual management prior to privatization. 
Otherwise, the public monopoly would be replaced by a private monopoly with the 
logical concerns for users (airlines, passengers). Furthermore, privatization of all 
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airports as a block would imply that non-profitable airports are also included in the 
sale.8  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis, while table 3 shows the correlation matrix.  
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
 
The dependent variable takes a value within the range 0-1 so that a standard 
Ordinary Least Square regression is not applicable. We use two different techniques to 
estimate the equation for the determinants of (partial) privatization. First, we use the 
generalized linear model with fractional response variables that should be used when the 
variable of interest is a proportion or a fraction. Recall that our dependent variable is the 
percentage of private property owned by the management company.9  
Second, our dependent variable may have an over-representation of observations 
with value zero (pure public production). Hence, we also use a complementary log-log 
model where the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one when 
there is some degree of private production and zero in case of pure public production. 
The complementary log-log analysis is an alternative to the standard discrete choice 
                                                            
8 This fact could be compensated if the acquiring companies are granted monopolistic power over all the 
airport system, because monopolistic conditions could entail larger future benefits so a higher upfront 
payment in privatization. However, as shown by recent activity by the UK Competition Commission 
forcing divestiture of several BAA airports because of market dominance, regulatory risks of transferring 
a monopoly to private partners in the sector is high, which could be a deterrent for likely private partners 
in this type of operation, as shown for example by the long experience of failed privatization attempts in 
Spain, the country with the largest integrated management system in the OECD.  
9 See Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for details of this econometric method.  
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models, but it is unlike these models in that the distribution of the dependent variable is 
not symmetric about 0. Typically this model is used when the positive outcome is rare. 
In both regressions, standard errors are robust to any problem of heterocedasticity 
and are clustered at the country level to take into account the possible correlation of 
airports from a same country.  
Table 4 depicts the results of the estimation of equation (1) with the two different 
techniques. Results are qualitatively identical for all explanatory variables except the 
one for the percentage of traffic channeled by the airlines integrated within 
intercontinental airline alliances. The coefficient associated with this variable is only 
statistically significant in the regression that uses the fractional response variables 
method.  
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
 
All the variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant, with the 
exception of the variable related to the ideology of the political party in the year of the 
first sale which is not statistically significant.  
First of all, we find that airport privatization seems to be a pragmatic choice of 
governments. The variable of ideology is not statistically significant, while variables 
related with the economic interests of private investors or governments are clearly 
statistically significant. 
Indeed, larger airports are more likely to be have a higher degree of private 
involvement because we find that the coefficient associated to the variable of traffic is 
positive and statistically significant.  On the contrary, airports subject to competition 
from nearby facilities are less likely to be privatized because the coefficient associated 
to the variable of number of nearby airports is negative and statistically significant. 
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Thus, governments may have more incentives to sale some (or all) shares of airports 
with stronger expectations of future profits, because private investors may be willing to 
spend more resources to get involved in those airport managing firms.  
Given the levels of traffic, private investors may be less interested in congested 
airports because they must afford future investments in improving and expanding 
current capacity. In this regard, the coefficient associated to the variable of congestion 
(dummy for slot-coordinated airports) is negative and statistically.  Note also that 
airports with a higher proportion of traffic channeled by alliances are less likely to be 
privatized.10 Airports that are used by network airlines as a hub may be considered a 
strategic asset for governments.  
From the government point of view, it is more likely that airports are privatized in 
countries where the amount of public debt is higher. The coefficient associated to the 
variable of public debt is positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with 
previous literature on factors explaining privatization in which a typical result is that 
fiscal stress is a relevant explanatory factor of government service delivery choices, 
particularly in services involving important investments needs. Moreover, we must 
recall that full or partial privatization of airports can be used by government as a tool for 
obtaining revenues, given the high degree of commercialization of these facilities.  
Furthermore, we find that the share of private investors in airport managing firms is 
higher in the United Kingdom than in countries of continental Europe. The coefficient 
associated to the dummy variable for United Kingdom is positive and statistically 
significant. In this regard, note that full privatization is typical in the United Kingdom 
while partial privatization (where the government retains some shares of the firm) is 
more usual in continental Europe. Finally, we find clear evidence that privatization is 
                                                            
10 Recall that this variable is only statistically significant in the equation that uses the fractional response 
variables method.  
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less likely in airports managed like a system because the dummy variable for these 
countries is negative and statistically significant.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Mixed public-private companies have emerged in several sectors, such as local public 
services and transport infrastructure, as delivery forms that escape the dilemma between 
pure public and pure private forms. While mixed public-private companies are present 
in several continental European countries (as well as in other regions of the World, like 
Latin America), Anglo-Saxon types of legal regulations do not easily provide a 
framework prone to sharing government and private ownership within the same 
organization. Probably because of this, study of partial privatization and mixed public-
private companies in public services is very scant.  
 In this paper we undertake an empirical study that allows us to analyze the 
factors explaining mixed delivery choices, and also the degree of private participation in 
the partially privatized firms, an analysis that has been so far absent in the literature.  
We find that the degree of privatization of airports seems to be a pragmatic choice of 
governments. The variable of ideology is not statistically significant, while variables 
related with the economic interests of private investors or governments are clearly 
positive and statistically significant. Indeed, airports with stronger expectations of 
future profits are more likely to undergo more intense privatization. This is the case of 
larger airports and those not subject to competition from nearby facilities. 
Furthermore, we find that it is more likely that airports have higher degree of 
privatization in countries where the amount of public debt is higher. On the contrary, 
airports that may be considered as strategic for governments, (i.e.; airports that are used 
by network airlines as a hub) are less likely to be privatized.  
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We also confirm that the share of private investors in airport managing firms is 
higher in the United Kingdom than in countries of continental Europe. In this regard, 
note that full privatization is typical in the United Kingdom while partial privatization 
(where the government retains some shares of the firm) is the most frequent form of 
privatization in continental Europe. Finally, we find clear evidence that privatization is 
less likely in airports managed like a system. 
 In all, we find that Countries in the European Union other than the UK have chosen 
a strategy of using mixed public-private companies to give room to private interests in 
airport management. The fact that airports –particularly largest ones- are seen as 
strategic facilities, which retain some characteristics of local/regional monopoly, likely 
explains the small frequency of full privatization –not only of assets, but also of 
management- in Continental Europe. Within this framework, mixed public-private 
companies can offer a viable alternative for cooperation between public and private 
interests. Whether this is a good strategy regarding costs is largely an unexplored issue, 
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Table 1. Privatization of main airports in Europe 
Airport % Private ownership Year (s) of first sale to private 
investors 
London-Heathrow (LHR) 100 1987 
London-Gatwick (LGW) 100 1987 
London-Stansted (STN) 100 1987 
Edinburgh (EDI) 100 1987 
Glasgow (GLA) 100 1987 
Aberdeen (ABZ) 100 1987 
Venice (VCE) 71 1987 
Liverpool (LPL) 76 1990 
Glasgow-Prestwick (PIK) 100 1992 
Vienna (VIE) 60 1992-1995-2001 
Copenhagen (CPH) 60.8 1994-1996-2000 
Belfast (BFS) 100 1994 
London city (LCY) 100 1995 
Birmingham (BHX) 51 1997 
Bristol (BRS) 100 1997 
Naples (NAP) 70 1997 
Hahn (HHN) 65 1997 
Rome-Fiumicino (FCO) 95.75 1997-2001 
Rome-Ciampino (CIA) 95.75 1997-2001 
London-Luton (LTN) 100 1998 
Dusseldorf (DUS) 50 1998 
Hannover (HAJ) 30 1998 
Zurich (ZRH) 42 2000 
Hamburg (HAM) 49 2000 
Torino (TRN) 44.29 2000 
Frankfurt (FRA) 29 2001 
Athens (ATH) 45 2001 
Newcastle (NCL) 49 2001 
Malta (MLA) 80 2002-2005 
Brussels (BRU) 62.1 2005 
Budapest (BUD) 75 2005 
Larnaca (LCA) 100 2005 
Pisa (PSA) 78 2005 
Paris-Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 32.5 2006 
Paris-Orly (ORY) 32.5 2006 
Bolonia (BLQ) 13.90 2007 
Leeds (LBA) 100 2007 
  Note: We do not account for further changes in the identity of private investors after the first sale.  

















Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 






Private (% private owership) 0.26 0.38 0 1 
Total traffic (000 passengers) 11648.15 12937.78 2420.71 68279.36 
Number_nearby_airports 0.67 1.005 0 5 
%Traffic_airlines_alliances 0.43 0.28 0 0.90 
DSlots (1 = airports coordinated 
slots)  
0.6 0.49 0 1 
PublicDebt (% over GDP) 57.71 26.06 9 107.4 
Ideology (index of the political 
party in the government; right 









DUK (1 = Airports located in 
United Kingdom) 
0.17 0.37 0 1 
DSystem (1 = Airports located in 
countries with an integrated 
system) 
0.35 0.49 0 1 
 
Table 3. Matrix of correlations of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
 Private Traffic Nearby  alliances slots debt ideology UK System 
Private  1         
Traffic 0.11 1        
Nearby  0.36 0.03 1       
alliances -0.18 0.42 -0.20 1      
slots -0.30 0.38 -0.28 0.17 1     
debt 0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.12  1    
ideology -0.24 -0.04 -0.20 0.32 0.32 0.03 1   
UK 0.65 0.06 0.54 -0.33 -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 1  
System -0.47 -0.12 -0.41 -0.07 0.26 -0.30 0.40 -0.33 1 
 
Table 4. Estimates of the equation for factors explaining partial privatization  
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables  Share Private Ownership 
(Generalized linear model with 
fractional response variables) 
Dummy variable. 0:pure public production, 
1: some degree of private production 
(Complementary log-log model) 
Total_Traffic 0.00005 (0.00001)*** 0.00005 (0.00002)*** 
Number_nearby_airports -0.42  (0.24)* -0.26 (0.11)** 
%Traffic_airlines_alliances -1.78  (0.94)** -0.086 (0.95) 
Dslots -1.22  (0.49)*** -1.12 (0.45)** 
PublicDebt 0.026 (0.013)** 0.035 (0.015)** 
Ideology -0.13 (0.39) 0.012 (0.003) 
DUK 3.14 (0.52)*** 2.28 (0.71)*** 
DSystem -3.08 (0.57)*** -2.54 (0.66)*** 







Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for correlation between airports of a same 
country. 
Note 2: Stastistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
